January 2, 1999, PLAINTIFF LAMBROS' RESPONSE TO THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS: 1.) December 12, 1998, Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motions and in Support of Defendant's Motions; 2.) December 14, 1998, Defendant's motion to dismiss et al.; 3.) December 14, 198 Affidavit of Sheila Regan Faulkner; 4.) December 14, 1998, Defendant Sheila Regan Faulkner's Response to Plaintiff's Request for Admissions; 5.) December 14, 1998 Defendant Sheila Regan Faulkner's Response to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories. Served on January 5, 1999, in LAMBROS vs. FAULKNER, Civil No. 98-1621. Total page fourteen (14) including Certificate of Service and NO EXHIBITS.


LAMBROS vs. FAULKNER et al., CIVIL CASE NO. 98-1621 (DSD/JMM)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby state under the penalty of perjury that a true and correct copy of the following:

1) December 12, 1998, MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS AND IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS;
2) December 14, 1998, DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS ET AL.;
3) December 14, 1998, AFFIDAVIT OF SHEILA REGAN FAULKNER;
4) December 14, 1998, DEFENDANT SHEILA REGAN FAULKNER'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS;
5) December 14, 1998, DEFENDANT SHEILA REGAN FAULKNER'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES.

was served on the following persons this 5th day of January, 1999 via U.S. Mail:

1. Clerk of the Court
District of Minnesota
U.S. Federal Courthouse
316 North Robert Street
St. Paul, Minnesota 55101-1460

2. Attorney Donna Rae Johnson
300 McCall Bldg.
366 Jackson Street
St. Paul, Minnesota 55101
Attorney representing the defendants in this case.

3. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
Organization of American States
1889 F. Street N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006 USA
RE: TO BE FILED WITH JULY 30, 1998 COMPLAINT AND RELEASED TO 35 COUNTRIES THAT ARE MEMBERS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES.
U.S. Certified Mail No.
Z-574-070-023

Signed:

John Gregory Lambros, Pro Se
Reg. No. 00436-124
USP Leavenworth
P.O. Box 1000
Leavenworth, Kansas 66048-1000 USA

End Certificate of Service


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE STATE OF MINNESOTA

JOHN GREGORY LAMBROS, #00436-124
USP Leavenworth
PO Box 1000
Leavenworth, Kansas 66048-1000, USA
Web site:
Web site:
http://members.aol.com/BrazilByct
http://adpages.com/usal/brazilct.htm
http://adpages.com/andreaci.htm
http://members.aol.com/LambrosLDF
http://members.aol.com/BraziLien
http://members.aol.com/Lambrosb1 (final digit number 1)
http://www.brazilboycott.org

Plaintiff

vs.

ESTATE/WILL/BUSINESS INSURANCE OF DECEASED ATTORNEY CHARLES W. FAULKNER, 2680 Sumac Ridge, St. Paul, Minnesota 55110 USA

ATTORNEY SHEILA REGAN FAULKNER, 2680 Sumac Ridge, St. Paul, Minnesota 55110 USA

FAULKNER & FAULKNER, Attorneys-at-Law, 2680 Sumac Ridge, St. Paul, Minnesota 55110 USA;

JOHN & JANE DOE'S, persons employed by Attorney C.W. Faulkner, Sheila Regan Faulkner and Faulkner & Faulkner in the representation of John Gregory Lambros;

Defendants (Severally and jointly liable).

CIVIL CASE NO.
98-1621 (DSD-JMM)

DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY, Title 28 USC Rule 38 & 39.

COMPANION CASE NO.
U.S. vs. LAMBROS
, Criminal File No. CR-4-89-82(05), District of Minnesota, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals No. 65 F.3d 698 (1995).


PLAINTIFF LAMBROS' RESPONSE TO THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS:

1) December 12, 1998, MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS AND IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS;
2) December 14, 1998, DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS ET AL.;
3) December 14, 1998, AFFIDAVIT OF SHEILA REGAN FAULKNER;

End of page 1


4) December 14, 1998, DEFENDANT SHEILA REGAN FAULKNER'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS;
5) December 14, 1998, DEFENDANT SHEILA REGAN FAULKNER'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES.

 

COMES NOW, John Gregory Lambros, Plaintiff in the above-entitled action, stating in AFFIDAVIT FORM, opposition to the above-entitled documents dated December 12 and 14, 1998, by the Defendant Sheila Regan Faulkner and her Attorney Donna Rae Johnson:

JOHN GREGORY LAMBROS declares under penalty of perjury:

l. I am the plaintiff in the above-entitled case. I make this

declaration in the opposition to Defendant Sheila Regan Faulkner and Attorney Donna

Rae Johnson's above-entitled pleadings dated December 12 and~ 14, 1998, in this case.

2. Plaintiff Lambros denies each and every material allegation contained in the above-entitled pleadings, except as hereinafter may be expressed and specifically admitted.

FORTHCOMING HEARING(S) - PUBLIC PROCEEDING IN THIS CASE:

3. Plaintiff Lambros is requesting that all forthcoming hearings in this case before the court be held by TELEPHONE CONFERENCE CALL.

4. Plaintiff is requesting that the TELEPHONE CONFERENCE CALL be a public proceeding as though Plaintiff prisoner Lambros were present in open court and anyone can listen. This process is currently being used throughout the U.S. Bureau of Prisons and allows the prisoner to avail himself to the law library, legal material, savings to taxpayers as to transportation and housing, and potential security concerns.

5. Plaintiff Lambros would request a transcript of the TELEPHONE CONFERENCE CALL within the next three 3) working days so as to respond to any and all

End of page 2


issues developed during the TELEPHONE CONFERENCE CALL PUBLIC PROCEEDING in this case.

6. Plaintiff has attached as an exhibit copy of U.S. District Court Clerk John M. Waters, December 1, 1998, WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AD TESTIFICANDUM, in RUTLEDGE vs. U.S., Case No. 97-4054, that offers a format as to the use of court hearings by TELEPHONE CONFERENCE CALL. EXHIBIT A:

DECEMBER 12, 1998, MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS AND IS SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS:

7. Page 2: Defendants state that each practice law in fields separately and each paid separately, under their own SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS, NOT THE FEDERAL ID NO. OF FAULKNER & FAULKNER.

8. Plaintiff does not understand how a corporation by the name of Faulkner & Faulkner can have only two partners that only practice law under their own social security numbers when there principle place of business is located under the name of FAULKNER & FAULKNER.

9. Defendants claim Plaintiff did not give notice to the Estate of Charles W. Faulkner or within the Federal Court which allegedly ended March 30, 1998, NOR DID HE NOTIFY TUE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, SHEILA FAULKNER, OF SAID CLAIM.

10. Defendants are again submitting incorrect facts and possibly false information to this court as Plaintiff submitted his October 16, 1997, "A SECURITY (15 U.S.C.) CLAIM OF COMMERCIAL LIEN AND AFFIDAVIT and Plaintiff's October

16, 1997, PARTIAL LIST OF PROPERTY TO BE SEIZED AND HELD IN ESCROW FOR THE FUTURE SATISFACTION OF THIS COMMERCIAL LIEN, MAKING THIS LIEN A SECURITY REPRESENTING LIEN CLAIMANTS SUITABLE INTERESTS," to FAULKNER & FAULKNER, Attorneys~at-Law, Suite 500, 701 Fourth Avenue South~ Minneapolis, Minnesota 55415 via U.S. Certified Mail on OCTOBER 20, 1997. Both C.W. Faulkner and S.R. Faulkner were served same on October 20, 1997, under separate U.S. Certified Mailings at 2680 Sumac Ridge, St.

End of page 3


Paul, Minnesota 55110. (Refer to EXHIBIT O-1, Certificate of Service with the original June 15, 1998, DECLARATORY JUDGEMENT/COMPLAINT)

11. Plaintiff also requests the Court to note that the SECRETARY OF STATE FOR MINNESOTA was also mailed a copy on October 20, 1998.

12. TRW INFORMATION SYSTEM AND SERVICES was also notified as per Plaintiff's personal contact Helen Roth. It is Plaintiff's belief as to the workings of TRW's SYSTEM that the CLAIM OF COMMERCIAL LIEN would of been docketed an/or registered against FAULKNER & FAULKNER, C.W. FAULKNER, and S.R. FAULKNER, thus APPEARING IN ANY TYPE OF CREDIT CHECK THAT SHOULD OF BEEN CARRIED OUT BY THE ESTATE.

13. Plaintiff again placed FAULKNER & FAULKNER, C.W. FAULKNER, and S.R. FAULKNER on NOTICE with Plaintiff's FEBRUARY 6, 1998, "NOTICE OF DEFAULT, A SECURITY (15 U.S.C.) CLAIM OF COMMERCIAL LIEN THAT WAS FILED ON OCTOBER 20, 1997, AND AFFIDAVIT WITH EXHIBITS," on FEBRUARY 13, 1998. (Refer to EXHIBIT P-6 P-7, Certificate of Service within the original June 15, 1998, DECLARATORY JUDGEMENT/COMPLAINT).

14. Plaintiff requests the court to note that the CLERK OF THE COURTS, DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA WAS SERVED COPY ON FEBRUARY 13, 1998.

15. Again Plaintiff notified one of the big three credit reporting agencies in the United States, experian. Thus all credit reports in the name of defendants would show Plaintiff's lien. Mine Strawther is Plaintiff's contact person within experian's consumer affairs division.

16. Plaintiff suggests that Defendants review the "SUFFICIENT MEANS TO CONSTITUTE DUE PROCESS OF LAW TO SATISFY THE FIFTH AMENDMENT." See, MULLANE vs. CENTRAL HANOVER BANK & TRUST CO., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).

End of page 4


17. Defendants argument as to insufficient NOTICE is NULL AND VOID as the Minnesota Statute of Limitations for LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS AGAINST ATTORNEYS IS SIX (6) YEARS. See, SABES & RICHMAN INC. vs. MUENZER, 431 N.W.2d 916 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (Action for legal~al malpractice action was barred under 6-year statue of limitation, which began to run when infringing conduct BECAME APPARENT TO CLIENT, NOT EVEN FEDERAL LITIGATION against alleged infringer had been concluded). See generally Minnesota Statute §541.05, subd. 1(5).

18. Minnesota law states that a legal malpractice claim SURVIVES THE DEATH OF THE PLAINTIFF in an underlying personal injury suit. See) JACKSON vs. TAYLOR, 435 N.W.2d 127 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989), See Minnesota Statute S573-01.

19. The Federal Public Defenders Office in Minneapolis, Minnesota was PLACED ON NOTICE ON OR ABOUT AUGUST 13, 1997, as to Plaintiff's suit against Defendants and responded to Plaintiff on August 18, 1997, as to the statute of limitations. DEFENDANT CHARLES W. FAULKNER DIED ON OCTOBER 6, 1997. See Exhibit P--5 within the original June 15 1998 DECLARATORY JUDGEMENT/COMPLAINT).

20. Defendants can not claim that they were not served notice as to this action.

21. Page 4. Defendant S.R. Faulkner states she has complete Plaintiff 's request for ADMISSIONS

22. Plaintiff states that Rule 36 governs requests for ADMISSION and defendant S.R. Faulkner has admitted all admissions as she did not respond within thirty (30) days of service.

23. Page 4. Defendants state they are refusing to answer Plaintiff 's interrogatories at this time and are asking for a Protective Order.

24. Plaintiff requests this Court to refer and consider his October 26. 1998, "MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT ATTORNEY SHEILA REGAN FAULKNER TO Answer FIRST SET OF WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES PROPOUNDED UNDER RULES 34(b) 37(a), and 69(a) FRCP, FOR ORDER TO COMPEL."

25. Defendant's state that Plaintiff's claims do not rise under the Constitution and that Plaintiff's appellate counsel did not raise the claim for incompetency of counsel in the lower court, as she would have included it in the appeal.

End of page 5


26. Plaintiff is awed by Defendant's statement as he can only wonder if defendant's read U.S. vs. LAMBROS, 65 F.3d 698 (8th Cir. 1995). Yes the Eighth Circuit did vacate Plaintiff's life sentence without parole in Count One (1), as he was not subject to the statute's mandatory life sentence for conspiracy to distribute cocaine. Thus Defendant's FAILURE TO KNOW THE LAW rendered defendant's CONSTITUTIONALLY INEFFECTIVE, as failure to raise potentially helpful provisions of the statute, or even be able to read same, fell outside professional standards of performance, and error prejudiced Plaintiff Lambros. Please review U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6. Generally, the Court of Appeals does not resolve ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal except in those rare circumstances in which the record is so clear that remand is unnecessary. See, U.S. vs. SOTO, 132 F.3d 56 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

27, Page 6: Defendant's state "The case against you is one without a chance of success either on the legal or factual issues.' The plea did not call for a life sentence. See Exhibit A. Mr. Lambros chose to ignore counsel's advice and go to trial, where he was found guilty on all four counts."'

28. Plaintiff again states that Defendant's are lying to this Court, as the plea agreement did offer the possibility of a life sentence if the Court chose to give Plaintiff one. Defendant Charles Faulkner did not even argue the fact that Plaintiff Lambros could not receive more than a THIRTY (30) YEAR SENTENCE ON ANY COUNT, AS THE CONSTITUTION OF BRAZIL DOES NOT ALLOW FOR MORE THAN A 30 YEAR SENTENCE AND PLAINTIFF LAMBROS WAS PROTECTED BY SAME DUE TO HIS EXTRADITION FROM BRAZIL.

29. Page 6: Defendant refer to Plaintiff's argument under Title 18 U.S.C.A. Section 201, justifying same as "PLEA BARGAINS HAVE BEEN REGULARLY USED BY THE COURTS. EVEN IF THE MATTER IS NOW UNDER CONSIDERATION, IT WAS COMPLETELY VALID AT THE TIME Mr. Faulkner was representing Plaintiff."

End of page 6


30. Plaintiff would only request that Defendant's to read TITLE 18 U.S.C.A. 201(b)(2):

(2) to influence such public official or person who has been selected to be a public official to commit or AID IN COMMITTING, or COLLUDE IN, or ALLOW, ANY FRAUD, or MAKE OPPORTUNITY FOR TUE COMMISSION OF ANY FRAUD, on the UNITED STATES; or

that became law on October 23, 1962. Almost 30 years before Plaintiff went to trial.

31. Page 8: Defendant's admit that they were served with copy of Plaintiff's DECLARATORY JUDGEMENT/COMPLAINT and ADMISSIONS on July 17, 1998.

32. Plaintiff did not receive a response to the ADMISSIONS within thirty (30) days, thus all admissions are deemed admitted. "Failure of party to answer requests for admissions amounts in law to admission of facts." See, U.S. vs. WHEELER, 161 F.Supp. 193 (D.C.Ark. 1958); See, also, MANGAN vs.BRODERICK & BASCOM ROPE CO., 351 F.2d 24 (C.A.Ill. 1965), cert. denied 86 S.Ct. 930, 383 U.S. 926, 15 L.Ed.2d 846.

DECEMBER 14, 1998, AFFIDAVIT OF SHEILA REGAN FAULKNER:

33. Page 3, paragraph 6: Defendant states that Plaintiff did not notify Defendant Sheila Regan Faulkner of any claim.

34. Plaintiff Lambros did place Defendant S.R. Faulkner on LEGAL NOTICE as to claims as early as OCTOBER 16, 1997, five (5) months before March

30, 1998. Please refer to paragraphs nine (9) through twenty (20) in this response.

35. Page 4, paragraph 12: Defendant states she has completed Plaintiff's request for Admissions.

End of page 7


36. Plaintiff does not except Defendant's responses to ADMISSIONS as all ADMISSIONS have been admitted as the equivalent of sworn testimony due to the fact they were not responded to within thirty (30) days. Defendant's must understand that "Unless the party securing an ADMISSION can depend on its binding effect, he cannot safely avoid the expense of preparing to prove the very matters on which he has secured the admission, and the purpose of the rule is defeated." See, Field & McKusick, Maine Civil Practice § 36.4 (1959); FINMAN, 71 Yale L.J. 371, 418-426; COMMENT, 56 Nw. U.L.Rev. 679, 682-683 (1961).

37. Page 4, paragraph 13: Defendant respectfully refuses to answer Plaintiff's interrogatories and requests a Protective Order from this Court.

38. Plaintiff requests this Court to review paragraphs 23 & 24 in this response.

DECEMBER 14, 1998, DEFENDANT SHEILA REGAN FAULKNER'S RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS:

39. Plaintiff has excepted all ADMISSIONS submitted to Defendant S.R. Faulkner as admitted as the equivalent of sworn testimony due to the fact Defendant did not respond within 30 days under Rule 36.

DECEMBER 14, 1998, DEFENDANT SHEILA REGAN FAULKNER'S RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES:

40. Defendant's are playing a game with this Plaintiff and the Court in requesting a PROTECTIVE ORDER in one motion in front of this Court and responding in an incomplete manner to Defendant S.R. Faulkner's FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES.

41. Defendant's Attorney Donna Rae Johnson's poor command of law or deliberate refusal to include the Federal Rule(s) of Civil Procedure Rule she is invoking leaves this Plaintiff at a loss and avails Defendants an UNFAIR TACTICAL ADVANTAGE.

End of page 8


42. Therefore, now that Defendant's claim to be responding to Plaintiff's FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES that were submitted to S.R. Faulkner, Plaintiff believes that Defendant's should submit a MOTION TO TERMINATE OR LIMIT INTERROGATORIES under Rule 30(d), not Kule 26(c).

43. Plaintiff reminds the Defendants that they have not established the existence of good cause. To demonstrate good cause, Defendant must make a particular and specific demonstration of facts establishing the necessity for a protective order. Mere stereotyped or conclusory statements are not sufficient to demonstrate good cause. Motions for protective orders which seek to prohibit or delay discovery are not favored. See, KRON MEDICAL CORP. vs. GROTH, ll9 FRD 636 (MD NC 1988); SALTER vs. UPJOHN CO., 593 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1979).

44. Plaintiff opposes a protective order as to INTERROGATORIES and requests all questions within Defendant's requested PROTECTED CLASS not be protected, thus placing the burden on Defendant's moving for the protective order to justify the inclusion of the designated items within the protected class. See, CIPOLLONE vs. LIGGETT GROUP INC., 785 F.2d 1108 (3rd Cir. 1986)

DECEMBER 14, 1998, DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS ET AL.:

45. Defendant's request an ORDER dismissing Plaintiff's entire action.

46. Plaintiff requests this court to deny same.

47. Defendant's request an ORDER denying Plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint.

48. Plaintiff requests this court to deny same.

End of page 9


49. Defendant's request this Court to grant Defendants a protective order against answering Plaintiff's interrogatories.

50. Plaintiff request this Court to deny same and rule on Plaintiff's MOTION TO COMPEL Defendants to answer Plaintiff's interrogatories.

51. Defendants request this Court to grant Defendants the right to file and serve answers to Plaintiff's Request for ADMISSIONS.

52. Plaintiff requests this Court to deny same and ORDER all ADMISSIONS as sworn testimony due to Defendants not answering same within thirty (30) days of service.

53. Defendants request this Court to grant Defendants the right to amend its answer to include the defense that Plaintiff failed to file a claim against the Estate of Charles W. Faulkner within the time allowed under Minn. Stat. 524.803.

54. Plaintiff requests that his Court deny same.

120 DAY STATE NOTICE OF CLAIM LIMITATION:

55. In FELDER vs. CASEY, 101 L Ed 2d 123, 138 (1988), the Supreme Court also rejected the application of a 120 day state notice of claim limitations as a prerequisite to the enforcement of federal rights in state court, reasoning:

"Under the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution, "[t]he relative importance to the State of its own law is NOT MATERIAL when there is a conflict with a valid federal law," for "any state law, however clearly within a State's acknowledged power, which interferes with or is CONTRARY TO FEDERAL LAW, MUST YIELD." (quoting, FREE vs. BLAND, 369 US 663, 666 (1962)) Accord: HURON PORTLAND CEMENT CO. vs. DETROIT, 362 US 440, 443-44 (1960).

56. Here Defendants are trying to apply the State of Minnesota common law of finality to the Estate of Defendant Charles Faulkner, which is pre-empted under the Supremacy Clause, and therefore, "not material" to Plaintiff's

End of page 10


substantive federal rights as created under Title 18 USC § 1964(c).

57. The 1970 Congressional enactment of Title 18 U.S.C. §1964(c) empowered petitioners with standing for quasi-prosecutorial enforcement of federal RICO criminal statutes, particularly as here Title 18 USC §201(b)(2), 201(c)(2), 1503, and 1512, as a matter of SUBSTANTIVE federal rights to "[a]ny person injured in his property or business by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter . . .". Inasmuch as §§201(b)(2), 201(c)(2), 1503, and 1512, as RICO predicate offenses, prohibit and remove all federal agency discretion to perpetrate a "FRAUD UPON A FEDERAL COURT," see, U.S. vs. SINGLETON, 144 F.3d 1343, 1346 (lOth Cir. 1998), these criminal statutes create "substantive" federal rights. NASH vs. BLACK, 781 F.2d 665, 668 (8th Cir. 1986).

58. Clearly, Congress intended to clothe private parties with limited quasi-prosecutorial powers traditionally reserved exclusively to the Attorney General by its enactment of Title 18 USC §1964(c) for remedial enforcement of specified criminal statutes set forth under Title 18 USC §1961.

59. Given Congressional intent to extend the enforcement of RICO criminal offenses to "any person," including plaintiff, it must be presumed that Congress was aware of the principle of COMITY and that "where the Constitution grants the Federal Government the power to act, the SUPREMACY CLAUSE dictates that federal enactments will prevail over competing STATE exercise of power." See, U.S. vs. GILLOCK, 63 L Ed 2d 454, 463 (1980).

60. In GILLOCK, the Supreme Court rejected a RICO defendant/Tennessee legislator's STATE LAW CLAIM to an evidentiary privilege, under RULE 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the speech or debate clause of the Federal Constitution (Art. I, §6, cl. 1), quoting:

"Whatever may be the case with respect to civil liability generally, . . . we have never held that

End of page 11


the performance of the duties of judicial, legislative, or executive officers, requires or contemplates the immunization of otherwise criminal deprivation of constitutional rights . . . On the contrary, the judicially fashioned doctrine of official immunity does not reach so far as to immunize criminal conduct proscribed by an Act of Congress . . ." GRAVEL vs. U.S., 406 US 606, 627 (1972).

"We conclude, therefore, that although principles of comity command careful consideration, our cases disclose that where important federal interests are at stake, as in the enforcement of federal criminal statutes, COMITY YIELDS." GILLOCK, 63 L Ed 2d at 465.

 

61. Plaintiff again reminds Defendants that summary judgement in only appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgement as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); accord ANDERSON vs. LIBERTY LOBBY, INC., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). The moving party has the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact. CELOTEX CORP. vs. CATRETT, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Plaintiff strongly suggests that Defendants have showed no genuine facts to contest the factual record and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to Plaintiff for this Court to dismiss this action.

62. Plaintiff again states to the Court that he has not had an opportunity to complete discovery. Plaintiff needs the names and addresses of John and Jane Does so he may move forward with admissions and interrogatories to them. Again Defendants have not yet complied with Plaintiff's discovery requests.

63. The factual disputes in this case can't be resolved without a jury trial.

64. Plaintiff is still being tortured and controlled daily due to his forced brain implantation by Brazilian Government Officials, that monitor and

End of page 12


control this Plaintiff's mental functions, thoughts, and deeds. Plaintiff is capable of producing better legal writings and responding in a quicker fashion when not under the control of a communist government faction.

65. Please support the BOYCOTT OF BRAZIL by reviewing Plaintiff's web sites and consider being part of the citizens of Minnesota that will request SELECTIVE PURCHASING LEGISLATION against Brazil in 1999. The International "FREE BRAZIL ALLIANCE" web site is under construction.

 

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Title 28 U.S.C.A. §1746.

Signed the 2nd day of January, 1999:

John Gregory Lambros, Pro Se
Reg. No. 00436-124
USP Leavenworth
P.O. Box 1000
Leavenworth, Kansas 66048-1000

 

ADDITIONAL EXHIBITS FOR THE COURTS REVIEW:

1. EXHIBIT B: January 28, 1997, MEMO from St. Paul Attorney Jeffrey L. Orren regarding "TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH DARLEEN AT THE RAMSEY COUNTY RECORDER'S OFFICE. (2 pages) Please note that Darleen stated that my liens ARE FILED.

2. EXHIBIT C: February 24, 1998, INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM from Jean Stepan of the Ramsey County Attorney's Office to Marc Diersen of the Ramsey County Recorder' Office, St. Paul, Minnesota. PLEASE NOTE that the Ramsey County Attorney's Office is instructing the Ramsey County Recorder's Office to add all of LAMBROS' LIENS TO THE FILE PURSUANT OF MINN. STATUTE SECTION 600.23 WHIC~ PROVIDES: " . . . PERSON DEPOSITING SAME A RECEIPT, . . . SO ENDORSED AS TO INDICATE THEIR GENERAL NATURE, THE NAMES OF THE PARTIES THERETO, and the time when received . . ."

3. EXHIBIT D: March 3, 1998, Lambros' letter to Marc Diersen, Ramsey County Recorder's Office, St. Paul, Minnesota regarding February 24, 1998, INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM as described in EXHIBIT C. PLEASE NOTE that Lambros refers to both liens he has filed and that the Recorder's Office is not following Minnesota Statute, Section 600.23.


The address for the Boycott Brazil homepage is:
http://brazilboycott.org

Return to Boycott Brazil Homepage


For more information write (snail mail) JOHN GREGORY LAMBROS directly at:

JOHN GREGORY LAMBROS
Prisoner No. 00436-124
U. S. Penitentiary Leavenworth
PO Box 1000
Leavenworth, KS 66048-1000
USA

THANK YOU FOR YOUR SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE IN MY BOYCOTT OF BRAZILIAN PRODUCTS.