LAMBOS vo. U.S.A., Appeal No. 01-2671 District Court No. 4-89-82 (criminal), District of Minnasota.

CHRYSPICATE OF SERVICE

I certify under the penalty of perjury that I mailed the following:

PETITIONER LAMBBOS' RESPONSE TO OPPOSITION OF THE UNITED STATES TO PETITIONER'S APPLICATION TO FILE SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE SECTION 2255 PETITION, DATED JULY 16, 2001. This document is dated: JULY 23, 2001.

on this ZAth BAY OF JULY, 2001, from the U.S. Penitentiary Leavenworth mailroom, to the following individuals via U.S. Mail NOR FILING IN THIS ACTION:

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

JOHN CHROCHY LANGEOS, * CIVIL APPRAL NO. 01-2671

Petitioner/Appellant, * EE: CRIMINAL NO. 4-89-82.

ve. U.S. District Court for the District of

Minnesota, Fourth Division.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. *

Respondent/Appellee. * AFFIDAVIT FURN

PRITITIONER LAMINOS' RESPONSE TO OPPOSITION OF THE UNITED STATES TO PRITITIONER'S APPLICATION TO FILE EBOORD OR SUCCESSIVE SECTION 2255 PETITION, DATED JULY 16, 2001.

Fetitioner JOHN GREGORY LAMBROS, Pro Se, (hereinafter MOVANT) response to the government's motion dated July 16, 2001, entitled, "OPPOSITION OF THE UNITED STATES TO PETITIONER'S APPLICATION TO FILE SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE SECTION 2255 PETITION."

Movent denies each and every material allegation contained in the above entitled pleading by the government deted July 16, 2001, except as hereinefter may be expressed and specifically admitted.

The following information is being presented under penalty of perjury and is true and correct to the best of this Movent's knowledge:

- The government is correct in that Movent is filing a successive petition under 28 U.S.C. 52255 raising claims based on <u>APPRENDI vs. NEW JERSEY</u>, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000).
- 2. The government requests this court to deay this Movant's request to file a successive section 2255 petition because this court has held the Supreme Court has not made <u>APPRENDI</u> retroactive to cases on collateral review.

The government fails to state that the THIRD CIRCUIT has held 3. that a new Supreme Court case may be made retreactively applicable to cases on collateral review, and therefore relief may be had on a second or successive \$2255 motion under \$2255, if the case falls within one of the TRAGUE exceptions. See, WEST ve, VANCEN, 204 F.3d 53, 59 (3rd Cir. 2000). Also, the MINTH CIRCUIT requires application of the TEAGUE enalysis to second and successive petitions under \$2255 and held that identical language set forth in 28 U.S.C. \$2244(b) did not set a new standard, but rather codified the catroactivity set forth in TRACUE ve. LAME, 489 U.B. 288 (1989). See, FLOWERS ve. WALTER, 239 F.3d 1096, 1102-04 (9th Cir. 2001). The FLOWERS court held, as matters of first impression, that: "[s]n express statement of retreactivity by the Supreme Court is not required for a habeas claim to rely on "a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collecteral review by the Supreme Court" within the meaning of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Fanalty Act (AKDPA), such that the claim can be presented in a SECORD OR SUCCESSIVE HABRAS PETITION." (complesse added). See, FLOWERS, at 1096.

TILER vs. CAIN, Case No. 00-5961, Decided June 28, 2001 by the U.S. Septema Court:

- 4. The government DID MUX address the U.S. Supreme Court finding in TYLER vo. CAIN, Case No. 00-5961, decided June 28, 2001, within its' response dated July 15, 2001.
- 5. The Supreme Court reviewed the requirements for retroactivity in some great datail in TYLES. This Novant believes the Court concluded that a case can be made retroactive, if the Supreme Court says that it is retroactive, OR IF IT SPECIFICALLY APPLIES THE MATTER RETROACTIVELT. The Court found that neither a SPECIFIC STATEMENT, nor a EFECIFIC APPLICATION of CAGE had been made retroactive, therefore the lower courts in TYLES did not have the authority to apply CAGE

retroactively. The Court however did not decide whether <u>CAGE</u> should be applied retroactively, they limited their holding by saying that the issue of whether <u>CAGE</u> should be applied retroactively was not before them.

- for Movent also believes that FOOT NOTE 3 in TYLER vs. CAIN is very instructive as to AEDFA requirements: "[T]his requirement differs from the one that applicants must satisfy in order to obtain permission from the COURTS OF AFFEALS to file a second or successive patition. As noted above, a COURT OF AFFEALS may APTEORIZE such a filing only if it determines that the applicant makes a "PRIMA FACIE SHOWING" that the application satisfies the statutory standard. \$2244(b)(3)(c). But to survive dismissal in district court, the applicant must "sho[w]" that the claim satisfies the standard." See, TYLER, Foot Note 3.
- 7. Movement believes that he has satisfied the stendard of making a "PRIMA PACIE SHOWING" to this Court.
- B. Movant DORS NOT have access to the over fifth (50) cases <u>REMANDED</u> by the United States Supreme Court as to violations of <u>APPRENDI vs. NEW JERSET</u>, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000), to determine if the Supreme Court <u>TAS</u> made a <u>SPECIFIC</u> <u>APPLICATION</u> or <u>SPECIFIC</u> STATEMENT as to retroactivity.
- 9. BUNEVIE, THE SEPRENC COURT MAY OF MADE APPRIND! RETROACTIVE IS,

 H.S. va. SMITE, 241 P.34 546 (7th Cir. 2001). This Movent requests this court to

 review U.S. ve. SMITE as to the Supreme Court making a SPECIFIC APPLICATION OF

 RETROACTIVITY to APPRENDI. In SMITH the U.S. Supreme Court REMAINSD Smith's case

 AFTER the Seventh Circuit affirmed his drug conspiracy on DIRECT APPEAL due to a

 motion filed for resentencing under Title 18 U.S.C. \$3582(c). The U.S. Supreme Court

 cite for remand is, SMITH vs. U.S., No. 00-5198, 148 L.Ed.2d 270 (2000). The

 Seventh Circuit stated, "[F]or a FORETH TIME we consider arguments presented by

 Anthony Smith. The first time the case was here, on direct appeal from his

 conviction, we rejected most of his contentions but remanded for inquiry into the

 possibility of juror prejudice.... The district court rejected Smith's position

10. Movant offered this Court an overview of RIVERS vs. ROADWAY EXPRESS, 128 L.Ed.2d 274, 278, Head Note 9s, 9b (1994), on page 11 of his MEMORANDUM OF FACT AND LAW, so to the Supreme Courts' view on the EXTENDED AFFLICATION of a JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF AN EXISTING STATUTE. The Supreme Court held;

"9s, 9b. A judicial construction of a STATUTE is an AUTHORITATIVE STATEMENT OF WHAT THE STATUTE MEAST REPORE AS WELL AS AFTER THE DICIBION of the case giving time to that construction; . . BUT WHEN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CONSTRUCT A STATUTE, THE SUPREME COURT IS EXPLAINING ITS UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT THE STATUTE HAS MEAST CONTINUOUSLY SINCE THE DATE WHEN THE STATUTE RECARS LAW; in statutory cases, the Supreme Court has BO ASTROCTIVE depart from the congressional command setting the EFFECTIVE DATE OF A LAW THAT CONCRESS HAS EMACTED."

Also <u>RIVERS</u>, at 289, stated:

"It is this Court's responsibility to say what a statute nears, and once the court has spoken, it is the duty of other courts to respect that understanding of the governing rule of law. A judicial construction of a STATUTE is an authoritative statement of what the STATUTE TEACH AS WELL AS AFTER THE DECISION OF THE CASE GIVING RISE TO THAT CONSTRUCTION."

the AEDPA CHE-TEAR CHACK FREION in authorizing a SUCCESSIVE 12255. This problem occurred when pro se litigants filed and court's defaulted there BAILEY/SOUSLEY arguments. See, BAILEY vs. U.S., 123 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995) and BOUSLEY vs. U.S., 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998). This can be proven by reviewing the SECOND CIRCUIT decision in a case discussing BAILEY vs. U.S., that the ONE (1) YEAR ENGAS to run when

BALLET was decided (NOT WHEN IT WAS APPLIED REPROSCRIVELY IN BOSSLEY vs. U.S.).

See, TRIESTMAN vs. U.S., 124 P.3d 361, 371 and Foot Note 13 (2nd Cir. 1997). This

Court recently stated in ABDULLAN vs. U.S., 240 P.3d 583, 585 (8th Cir. 2001),

"[E]ven assuming the validity of his contention, we decline to authorize a SUCCESSIVE

\$2255 proceeding because ABDULLAN's BAILET claim is TONE-RANGED. AEDFA establishes

a CHE-TRAN CHACK FEBIOD, ENDING ON APRIL 24, 1997, in which federal defendants were

sutherized to file a \$2255 motion besed on claims existing on the date of its

enactment . . . Consequently, AEDFILAN had to assert his BAILET claim FEBOR 20

APRIL 24, 1997." (emphasis added). See, AEDFILAN, at 240 F.3d at 686.

QUICLUSION:

- 13. This Movant is requesting this Court to review <u>0.8. vs. SMITS</u>,

 241 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2001) and the over fifth (50) cases the Supreme Court

 REMANDED as to violations of <u>AFFRENDI</u>. Movant believes the Supreme Court made

 <u>AFFRENDI</u> EXTROACTIVE to cases on collateral review in <u>0.8. vs. GMITS</u>. See, paragraph

 nine (9) in this motion for an overview.
- 14. Movent, so per his reading of TTLEE vs. CAIR, believes that this Court has the duty to determine that this Movent has made a "FRIMA FACIS SHOWING" to satisfy the statutory standard to file a second or successive \$2255 petition.
- 15. If this Court <u>does not</u> choose to give EXTROACTIVE APPLICATION of this Bovent's request to file a second or successive \$2255, this Movent is requesting this Court to hold this above-entitled application <u>IN ADSTANCE</u> pending the Supreme Court's resolution of when <u>APPLIEDI</u> will be made retroactive to cases on collateral review. This rational should conserve the resources of this Court.
- 16. I JOHN CRECORY LAMBROS declars under penalty of perjuty that the foregoing is true and correct parament to Title 26 U.S.C.A., Section 1746.

 EXECUTED ON: July 23, 2001

Respectfully submitted,

June Gregory Lambres, \$00436-124

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